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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The state alleged that the
defendant had driven under the influence for the second time in ten year and with an excessive
blood alcohol level and without privileges. The Magistrate Court heard and denied a Motion to
Suppress the evidence resulting from the seizure of the defendant. The defendant then entered a
conditional plea to the Driving under the influence with an excessive blood alcohol level charge.
The defendant appealed the denial of his Motion to Suppress. The District Court heard argument
and eventually upheld the Magistrate Court's ruling. The defendant again appealed.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts

On July 22, 2013, Officer Timothy Neal of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department charged
the defendant with Driving under the influence for the second time in ten years and with an
excessive blood alcohol level on Tr. p. I 0, L. 1-8; Idaho Uniform Citation No. 105184. On
October 18, 2013, the Magistrate Court held a hearing on the defendant's Motion to Suppress the
evidence resulting from the officer's seizure of his person.
After taking testimony from Patricia Franks and Officer Neal, the Court found that
Officer Neal arrived on scene and spoke to Ms. Franks about an accident she claimed to have
seen. Tr. p. 31, L. 3-21. The officer inspected the vehicle involved in the crash, possibly both
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vehicles, and found no evidence of any damage or anything else that would have required
reporting the accident. Tr. p. 31, L. 1-5.
The officer then went to the Coeur d'Alene Lake beach with Ms. Franks and the two
identified the defendant, at the time in the water in the lake, as the driver of the vehicle. Tr. p. 32,
L. 6-11. The officer asked the defendant to get out of the water so he could speak with him. Tr.

p. 32, L. 12-14. The officer was in uniform with a badge and gun. Tr. p.35, L. 6-13. At the time
the officer made this request, the Court found:
The record as the Court recalls was that [the officer] asked if [the defendant] could speak
with him. Just a minute. Officer Neal made contanct with the defendant who was in the
water with the occupant of the vehicle, about chest deep in the water. He approached the
defendant and asked if he could speak with him and then they had the contact and the
defendant came forward.
Tr. p. 35, L. 18-24. The Court found that as Mr. Burdett came out of the water the officer
noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage and that Mr. Burdett had slurred speech and bloodshot
eyes. Tr. p. 32, L. 22-25.
The Court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable and articuable suspicion that the
defendant had committed a crime at the time he asked him to get out of the lake. Tr. p. 33, L. 2-6.
The Court found that the contact was consensual, and that no seizure occurred. Tr. p. 33, L. 6-9.
The Court then denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress. The defendant entered a
conditional plea to Driving under the Influence with an excessive blood alcohol level at that time
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preserving the right to appeal the Magistrate's denial of his Motion to Suppress. On January 24,
2014, the defendant's written conditional plea was offered to and accepted by the Magistrate and
judgment was entered on the Driving under the influence charge. The defendant timely filed a
motion to appeal by right under I.C.R. I l(a)(2) from the judgment of the Magistrate Court and
eventually appealed the judgment and had the sentence stayed.
On July 31, 2014, the District Court heard oral argument from the parties. On August 6,
2014, the Court issued a written opinion. The Court held that the factual situation was the same
as that in State v. Fly, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct.App.1991). See Decision on Intermediate Appeal at 3.
However, the Court misread Fry to hold that a seizure had not occurred. Id., cf Fry, 122 Idaho at
103. The District Court thus upheld the ruling of the Magistrate Court. The defendant timely
appealed the District Court's ruling.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether an officer seizes a swimming defendant by standing on the shore and asking
him to get out of the lake to speak with him.
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ARGUMENT

I.
A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in finding that the officer did not seize the defendant. This

finding is not supported by the Magistrate Court's factual findings and is based on the District
Court's misreading of State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct.App.1991) and must be reversed.
B.

Standard of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct.App.1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789 (Ct.App.1999).
C.

The officer seized the defendant.
A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the

street or other public place and asks a few questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991);

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983). Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a
particular individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine
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identification. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984);
State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723 (Ct.App.1985). So long as police do not convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed "consensual" and no
reasonable suspicion is required. See, e.g., Bostick, supra. A seizure occurs-and the Fourth
Amendment is implicated-when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained a citizen's liberty. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968).
The critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances sunounding
the encounter, "the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business." Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567,569 (1988).
In Delgado, the Court determined there was no seizure even though
several uniformed INS officers were stationed near the exits of the factory.
The Court noted: "The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable
threat of detention to these workers, ... the mere possibility that they would
be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have
resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be
seized or detained in any meaningful way."
US. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,205 (2002) quoting Delgado, 446 U.S. at 219. Thus,
assuming that the opposite of the Delgado scenario leads to the opposite conclusion,
blocking all the exits with officers and having them start questioning citizens will amount
to a seizure.

In this case, the Magistrate Court found that Officer Neal had not seized the defendant
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through either a show of physical force or authority. While the facts the Magistrate found are not
in dispute, the record shows that under the totality of the circumstances, a nonconsensual seizure
did occur. The Idaho Court of Appeals found in State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct.App.1991 ),
contrary to the District Court's opinion, that:
the state argues that Fry "voluntarily" rolled down his window at Officer Wilson's
request. The state points to the fact that the officer displayed no weapons or other
show of force, and maintains that the officer simply sought Fry's cooperation in
answering his questions. Officer Wilson, fully dressed in his police officer's
uniform, knocked on the window of Fry's pickup. Fry rolled down the window
and Wilson asked Fry what he was doing and if Wilson could have his driver's
license. Unlike other cases in which the police request the subject's cooperation in
answering questions, the inquiry here as to what Fry was doing did not give Fry
the option of answering or not. In addition, the state's characterization of this
encounter ignores the significant fact that, at the time Officer Wilson approached
the driver's window, Officer Dunbar had placed himself directly behind Fry's
vehicle, the front end of which was nearly against the wall of a building, making it
impossible for Fry to drive away without running over Officer Dunbar. We
conclude that the police conduct in this case "would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go
about his business." Accordingly, we hold that Fry was "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
citing United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir.1989) (D.E.A. agents in civilian
clothing asked driver of vehicle to turn off engine; driver's compliance deemed voluntary.)
The evidence in the case before this Court resembles Fry and requires a finding that
Officer Neal seized the defendant. The officer's question, much like the one in Fry, did not give
the defendant the choice to simply not answer and go on swimming. While the Magistrate made
no specific finding on the point, the fact is that people cannot breathe water and can and often do
die when they attempt it. Further, a lake is a body of water of considerable size, particularly Lake
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Coeur d'Alene, the lake in this case. Thus, it is somewhat incredible to believe that the
defendant had the ability to "walk away" from the encounter or felt "free to leave." Without
some finding that the defendant had the ability to swim for long distances at speeds greater than
an officer can run, this Court must confine itself to the rational inference that would have arisen
from the defendant's predicament; namely, that he had nowhere to go. That alone is sufficient to
find a seizure under a Terry analysis. In State v. Greason, 809 P.2d 695, 697 (Or.App.1991) the
defendant was being questioned by an officer on a boat. The Court found:
Although defendant may have felt that he was not free to leave, that alone is not
dispositive. For example, during a "stop," which is "a temporary restraint of a
person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place," ORS 131.605(5),
a reasonable person would believe that he is "not free to leave." State v. Horton,
86 Or.App. 199,202, 738 P.2d 609 (1987). Nonetheless, a valid stop may be
followed by an officer's reasonable inquiry, ORS 131.615(1), and generally that
inquiry need not be preceded by warnings. Here, the officer did what was
necessary under the circumstances to gather information to confirm or dispel his
suspicion that defendant had operated the boat while intoxicated.

Id. The issue in that case was whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of
Miranda, but as the dissent of Judge Buttler reveals, the reason for finding the defendant
was detained is remarkably similar to the case at bar:
The court found that he was not free to leave at that time. That finding is
supported by the evidence: Defendant could not have left without swimming.

Id. at 699.

It is not unusual for the state to argue that the reasonable man indulges the police at every
opportunity. However, it is unusual for courts to accept the absurdity the state is forced to
present. In US v. Robertson, 736 F.3d 677, 680-81 (4th Cir.2013), the Court ruled that:
-8-

This case turns on the difference between voluntary consent to a request versus
begrudging submission to a command. Here, Mr. Robertson's behavior was the
latter. The area around the bus shelter was dominated by police officers. See US.
v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647,650 (4th Cir.1996) (citing number of officers present as
a factor weighing against consent). There were three patrol cars and five
uniformed officers with holstered weapons. Before the encounter, Mr. Robertson
observed every other individual in the bus shelter get "handled by" the other
police officers. (J.A 46.) As these individuals were being dealt with, yet another
officer approached the bus shelter and focused on Mr. Robertson.
The officer's questioning was immediately accusatory: Officer Welch's first
question was whether Mr. Robertson had anything illegal on him. See US. v. Elie,
111 F.3d 1135, 1145 (4th Cir.1997) (arguing that friendly conversation rather than
accusatory questions militates towards consent). When Mr. Robertson responded
with silence, the officer waved Mr. Robertson forward and asked to conduct a
search. Mr. Robertson's exit was blocked by Officer Welch, who never informed
Mr. Robertson that he had the right to refuse the search. See Lattimore, 87 F.3d at
650 (citing individual's knowledge of a right to refuse a search as relevant to a
consent finding). Officer Welch's initial, accusatory question, combined with the
police-dominated atmosphere, clearly communicated to Mr. Robertson that he was
not free to leave or to refuse Officer Welch's request to conduct a search. Mr.
Robertson's only options were to submit to the search peacefully or resist
violently. Mr. Robertson chose the sensible route. See US. v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d
951 (9th Cir.1998) ( "[Defendant] was forced to move so that the entering officers
would not knock him down. Consent that is not.") (internal quotations omitted).
Further, the police interaction in this case lacks factors that indicate consent. In
United States v. Elie, involving a search of the defendant's hotel room, we found it
highly relevant that the defendant repeatedly asked the police to search and secure
the items in his hotel room. 111 F.3d 1135, 1145 (4th Cir.1997). Similarly, in
Lattimore,. the defendant gave verbal consent and also signed a written consent
form after the police officer carefully explained that he wanted to search the
defendant's car. 87 F.3d at 649-50. In this case, meanwhile, Mr. Robertson never
gave verbal or written consent; he merely smTendered to a police officer's
command. Further, in both Elie and Lattimore,. the interactions between the police
and the defendants occurred in broad daylight and were characterized by relaxed,
friendly conversation between the two sides. See Elie, 111 F.3d at 1145 ("nothing
in the record indicates an environment that was coercive or intimidating. In fact,
Elie engaged the officers in friendly conversation"); Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 651 ("at
no time did the officer use force or a threat of force to coerce Lattimore's consent.
-9-

In fact, the two men engaged in friendly conversation"). The situation here,
meanwhile, lacks those indicia of consent. Officer Welch's initial question was
accusatory and was met with cold silence. Officer Welch never received verbal or
written consent. Mr. Robertson's behavior was not a clear-eyed, voluntary
invitation to be searched; it was a begrudging surrender to Officer Welch's order.
In sum, the facts as presented by Officer Welch are not enough for the government
to demonstrate valid consent. Surrounded by police officers, Mr. Robertson
watched as every individual in a bus shelter next to him was handled by the
police. Soon thereafter, Mr. Robertson was confronted by a police officer who
immediately sought to verify whether Mr. Robertson was carrying anything illegal
before waving him forward. Given these facts, we are compelled to conclude that
the government has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating consent.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's refusal to suppress evidence.

The Court in Robertson was dealing with a consent to search rather than a consensual
contact, but the rationale remains the same. Simply because the defendant recognized that he had
nowhere to go and acquiesced to the officer, hardly means he consented to an encounter, as the
Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in Fry, 122 Idaho at 103:
In Fry the police officers "unlike other cases in which the police request the subject's
cooperation in answering questions, the inquiry here as to what Fry was doing did not
give Fry the option of answering or not ... "

citing Fry, 122 Idaho at 103. Submission is not consent, as the citizens of this nation know all
too well.
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court is not a complicated one. The officer gave the defendant no
quarter and had no reason to force an encounter. When he did it anyway, he violated long
standing limits on executive power. Therefore, Article I§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution requires

- 10 -

that the evidence that resulted from the initial, unjustified seizure be excluded. State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho 981, 995 (1992) (not the exclusionary rule, but the constitutional provision itself
impedes fact-finding function of Court- but this is a "price the framers anticipated and were
willing to pay"). This Court should so find, reverse the denial of the defendanf s Motion to
Suppress, and remand this case with an order requiring that the Magistrate allow the defendant to
withdraw his plea.
DATED this

f ;1

day of November, 2014.
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COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

/f

OGSDON, ISB 8759
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on the
day of November, 2014, addressed
to:

14

X

X

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

[X]

Stephen W Kenyon
Clerk of the Courts
Idaho Supreme Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

- 11 -

LJ
LJ

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 854-8071

[X]

First Class Mail

